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use#OAP‘Making	 ﾠup	 ﾠYour	 ﾠMind’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠActivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠReason	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠBoyle,	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
—Forthcoming	 ﾠin	 ﾠPhilosophers’	 ﾠImprint—	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
ABSTRACT:	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠvenerable	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠtradition	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
distinguished	 ﾠby	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠagency	 ﾠor	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
“make	 ﾠup”	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis?	 ﾠ	 ﾠMany	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠher	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠ
occasions,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
concludes	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“making	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,”	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbelieves.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
argue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠan	 ﾠunacceptable	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
judging,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagency	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠare	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ“acts	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason,”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
doxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠvery	 ﾠnature,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠin	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
originate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
‘Making	 ﾠup	 ﾠYour	 ﾠMind’	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠActivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠReason	 ﾠ
Matthew	 ﾠBoyle,	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
—Forthcoming	 ﾠin	 ﾠPhilosophers’	 ﾠImprint—	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Thinking	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠresemblance	 ﾠto	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠto	 ﾠrest	 ﾠor	 ﾠarrest	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmovement;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠof	 ﾠinferring.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Every	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠconviction,	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
persuaded,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersuasion	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Aristotle,	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima,	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(407a34-ﾭ‐35)	 ﾠand	 ﾠIII.	 ﾠ3	 ﾠ(428a20)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIntroduction	 ﾠ
1.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ According	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠvenerable	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠtradition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠup	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeep	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠus	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
creatures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠits	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠand	 ﾠreact	 ﾠ
instinctively	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠperceptions;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠjudge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠthings	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
unthinkingly	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠthem;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠchoose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠhabitually	 ﾠassociate	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
thing	 ﾠwith	 ﾠanother;	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠfamiliar	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠhang	 ﾠ
together	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠare	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠmental	 ﾠlife	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠrational	 ﾠand	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠmentality	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
long	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠof	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠinterest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠreaffirmed	 ﾠin	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠwork	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠphilosophy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠmoral	 ﾠrequirements,	 ﾠChristine	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠtraces	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsubjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠcontrast:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠlower	 ﾠanimal’s	 ﾠattention	 ﾠis	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIts	 ﾠperceptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠare	 ﾠits	 ﾠwill…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠturn	 ﾠour	 ﾠattention	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠdesires	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠon	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠmental	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
conscious	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem…	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdesire	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠfind	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠto	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
back	 ﾠup	 ﾠand	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠinto	 ﾠview	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠdistance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNow	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
the	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠme	 ﾠand	 ﾠnow	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShall	 ﾠI	 ﾠact?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIs	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
desire	 ﾠreally	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠact?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Korsgaard	 ﾠ1996,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ93)	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠsimilarly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidely-ﾭ‐discussed	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠ
John	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠhas	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠperceptual	 ﾠ
experience	 ﾠderives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperception	 ﾠmust	 ﾠgive	 ﾠus	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons,	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠacting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
reasons,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
actions	 ﾠ—	 ﾠhence,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠstep	 ﾠback	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcandidate	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
acknowledge	 ﾠor	 ﾠrefuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcogency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(McDowell	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ183;	 ﾠcp.	 ﾠ
McDowell	 ﾠ1994,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ10-ﾭ‐13)	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠtheme	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpassages	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠintellect	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠfreedom,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“step	 ﾠback”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠmental	 ﾠgoings-ﾭ‐on	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠactions	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠitself	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠauthors,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠits	 ﾠroots	 ﾠin	 ﾠKant;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠclose	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠKantians.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactions	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmere	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbattle	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠconflicting	 ﾠimpulses	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠfree	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmere	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsensory	 ﾠintake	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠfree	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠis	 ﾠwidespread,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠhas	 ﾠroots	 ﾠin	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠintuition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ A	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovoke	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠor	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠask	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvery	 ﾠ
person.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
his	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠaccounts	 ﾠas	 ﾠreal	 ﾠexplanations:	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
cites	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhis	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠor	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠaction,	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommit	 ﾠ
ourselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcounterfactual	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠother	 ﾠthings	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwouldn’t	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
do	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdidn’t	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthese	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠask	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠactions	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecially	 ﾠgood	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
himself	 ﾠand	 ﾠmake	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠabout	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcauses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
causes	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠblame	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠhe	 ﾠgives	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinadequate.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.2	 ﾠ But	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠup”	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthings	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhappen	 ﾠto	 ﾠus?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ When	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠconfronted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠ
difficulties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠone	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠif	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠinvolves	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠsense	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“up	 ﾠto	 ﾠme”	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠP	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠ
conclusive	 ﾠto	 ﾠme,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠliberty	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠplease:	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP	 ﾠseems	 ﾠirresistible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠinconclusive,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
liberty	 ﾠeither:	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmake	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠspite	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecognized	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
evidence,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠtake	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill.”2	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Explaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠare	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
idea	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeciding	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠor	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠalso	 ﾠseems	 ﾠunhelpful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanother	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠis	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
unreasoned	 ﾠimpulse	 ﾠor	 ﾠinstinct,	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDeciding	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
instance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhoping	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠfreedom	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠup	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind”	 ﾠthus	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
freedom	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠilluminate	 ﾠby	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideas	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠor	 ﾠvoluntary	 ﾠaction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠcan	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠit?	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ“distancing”	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
1	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
action	 ﾠof	 ﾠso-ﾭ‐called	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcognition	 ﾠand	 ﾠaction	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠanimals.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpersuade	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠskeptics,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthose	 ﾠphilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
familiar	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠdescribed	 ﾠabove	 ﾠat	 ﾠface	 ﾠvalue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠreader	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠskeptical	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“rational”	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠway	 ﾠcognitively	 ﾠ“self-ﾭ‐determining”	 ﾠcan	 ﾠview	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠcome	 ﾠwith	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠwill”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontroversy,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠa	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠterribly	 ﾠcontroversial.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠWilliams	 ﾠ1973,	 ﾠ
O’Shaughnessy	 ﾠ1980,	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠBennett	 ﾠ1990,	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2000,	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠand	 ﾠSetiya	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠ“dominated”	 ﾠby	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠimpulses,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ“stepping	 ﾠback”	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
candidate	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“taking	 ﾠcharge”	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠformulations	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠ
us	 ﾠto	 ﾠpicture	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠ
one.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠevocative	 ﾠpicture,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠcount	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanation,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
incorporates	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠthing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimpulses	 ﾠto	 ﾠgo	 ﾠalong	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmust	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwanted	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
1.3	 ﾠ One	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠand	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreaction	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠurge	 ﾠhere.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠessay	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovoked,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠby	 ﾠsympathy	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠ
expressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠKorsgaard	 ﾠand	 ﾠMcDowell,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠby	 ﾠdissatisfaction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
explanations	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠconception	 ﾠderives	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠour	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunwarranted	 ﾠ
assumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠquery	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠ
conception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠcall	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠher	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrational	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠdiscrete	 ﾠoccasions,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ–	 ﾠshe	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠterminates	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
act,	 ﾠher	 ﾠ“making	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment”	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠeffecting	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
belief.4	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠinevitably	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
observations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠengage	 ﾠonly	 ﾠoccasionally,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠFor	 ﾠversions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreaction,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠOwens	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠand	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠ2003.	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremainder	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠessay,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrestrict	 ﾠmy	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠwill	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterms	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“doxastic	 ﾠagency”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“doxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination”	 ﾠ
interchangeably	 ﾠas	 ﾠlabels	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠover	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠelaborate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimilarities	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠgiving	 ﾠdue	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
differences	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠanother	 ﾠessay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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beliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠreject	 ﾠones	 ﾠwe	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠheld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠ
adds	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠindisputable	 ﾠfacts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠis	 ﾠdisputable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠagency	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠit	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠon	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
deliberate,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠholding	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠthought	 ﾠor	 ﾠdeliberation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠclose	 ﾠby	 ﾠsketching	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠframework	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
framework	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠintriguing	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠneglected	 ﾠideas	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAristotle.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠJudgment,	 ﾠBelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠ
2.1	 ﾠ The	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
doxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠ
bring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsome	 ﾠquotations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
remarks	 ﾠby	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexemplify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠ
Judgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠrational	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠdone	 ﾠfor	 ﾠreasons…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠstore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠmade	 ﾠas	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthese	 ﾠstored	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaccessed	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious,	 ﾠsubjective	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
thinker	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠrepresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstored	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Peacocke	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ88)	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠmental	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠaffirming	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition…	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠa	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠact…	 ﾠ	 ﾠExactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠone	 ﾠaccomplishes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠ[from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief]	 ﾠis	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠineffable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠ
familiar	 ﾠaccomplishment,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠstick	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠlastingly	 ﾠso	 ﾠrepresented.	 ﾠ(Shah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ
2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ503)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠaction	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠS	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠon	 ﾠS’s	 ﾠmental	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠS	 ﾠis	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
undergoing…	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠaction…	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
sound	 ﾠand	 ﾠvalid	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
conclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP…	 ﾠ	 ﾠConcluding	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠso	 ﾠhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠmediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Cassam	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ82-ﾭ‐83)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Although	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠterminologies	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠsomewhat,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠevidently	 ﾠshare	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
views	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠthem	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
views	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare,	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠwidespread	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontemporary	 ﾠphilosophy	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠAll	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ(an	 ﾠ“act”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“activity”)	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBelief,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
authors	 ﾠconclude,	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmaintain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
performing	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcause	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠmodified.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠ“store”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠacts,	 ﾠas	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠcore	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠ(PT)	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠhow	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠitems	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠcategories:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Core	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory:	 ﾠ
Judgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠstanding,	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐occurrent	 ﾠ
condition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStates	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠacts.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelements	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠelements	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠagential	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state,	 ﾠinstalling	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠones.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDeliberation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
proposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwill	 ﾠaccordingly	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠculminates,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthings	 ﾠgo	 ﾠ
well,	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠproposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠarrive	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFull	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory:	 ﾠ
Full	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Deliberation	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠculminates,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthings	 ﾠgo	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠviews	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠSoteriou	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠMcHugh	 ﾠ
2009,	 ﾠand	 ﾠShoemaker	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelaboration	 ﾠof	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ2007	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠinstances	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠdissent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠsee	 ﾠHieronymi	 ﾠ2006	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠ
Korsgaard	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠforthcoming.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠprincipal	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠcould	 ﾠ
come	 ﾠto,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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judgment	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠJudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
installs	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠherself,	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifies	 ﾠone	 ﾠshe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠholds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBelief	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠarticulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFull	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠopen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠrelates	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠview	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
judging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠcome	 ﾠinto	 ﾠexistence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Another	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠa	 ﾠcause	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprecede	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcoincides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
moment	 ﾠor	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠuse	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠ
Shah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠto	 ﾠissue	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
meant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠissuing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment”	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ“typically	 ﾠinduces”	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ503),	 ﾠand	 ﾠCassam	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ“mediated”	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠ(2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ82).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOther	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
precede	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠbring	 ﾠit	 ﾠabout,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommencement	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPeacocke,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
instance,	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“when	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,”	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ“an	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠ…	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠp”	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ89),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠMatthew	 ﾠSoteriou	 ﾠcharacterizes	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief”	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ93).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠformulations	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprecede	 ﾠbut	 ﾠcoincides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠor	 ﾠmoments	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠimmediately	 ﾠclear	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠviews	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠ
here	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworth	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind:	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠsymptom	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstability	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
model.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠabove	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠsubscribe	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCore	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
natural	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠFull	 ﾠTheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠcharacterizations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagency	 ﾠare	 ﾠbrief,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
me	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠevery	 ﾠelement	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFull	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠonce	 ﾠit	 ﾠwas	 ﾠspelled	 ﾠout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
continue	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠadvocates	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFull	 ﾠTheory,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhenceforth	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
object	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnoted),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpurposes,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwould	 ﾠagree	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠformulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPT	 ﾠis,	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠan	 ﾠintelligibly	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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attractive	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ
aim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠquery	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠconception	 ﾠinto	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠfocus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
extent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠobject	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠearlier,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmain	 ﾠcomplaint	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
unambiguously	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠa	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠview,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunambiguously	 ﾠendorse	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠone.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.2	 ﾠ What	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠPT	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠa	 ﾠsummary	 ﾠof	 ﾠevident	 ﾠfacts:	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠengage	 ﾠat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdiscretion,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠfinished	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠchange	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
believe,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnot	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdenied.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠadmitted,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠanything	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠform	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodify	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠones?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠobservations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠact,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠ
pointed	 ﾠout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“To	 ﾠbelieve”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
stative	 ﾠverb,	 ﾠascribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ(“S	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP”),	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtense	 ﾠ
(“S	 ﾠis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP”).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAscribing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠseems	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠto	 ﾠimply	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
dispositions,	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠdo	 ﾠif	 ﾠ—,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdoing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠretain	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠeven	 ﾠin	 ﾠdreamless	 ﾠsleep,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠusual	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“doing,”	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠanything.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBelieving	 ﾠthus	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠany	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
modifying	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcan	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“stored	 ﾠbelief.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ
gives	 ﾠa	 ﾠwidely-ﾭ‐discussed	 ﾠexample:	 ﾠ
Someone	 ﾠmay	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠundergraduate	 ﾠdegrees	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠother	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠare	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠequal	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠto	 ﾠher	 ﾠown,	 ﾠand	 ﾠexcellent	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠoperative	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
her	 ﾠassertions	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠquite	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠin	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠon	 ﾠhiring,	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠrecommendations,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreally	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠat	 ﾠall.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ90)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠSoteriou	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ84;	 ﾠMcHugh	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ246-ﾭ‐7;	 ﾠCassam	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ81.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“[o]ne	 ﾠmay	 ﾠreason	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
one’s	 ﾠplane	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠgoing	 ﾠto	 ﾠcrash…	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠfind	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill”	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ507).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠstandardly	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠsincere	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠin	 ﾠherself	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠbelief.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠreinforces	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthings	 ﾠdo	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠnormally,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
forming	 ﾠor	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.3	 ﾠ I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeach	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠa	 ﾠcore	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠindisputable,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠcase	 ﾠPT	 ﾠadds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcore	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisputable	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
doxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠexercised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠform	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠtakes.8	 ﾠ	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠPT	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠforced	 ﾠto	 ﾠrepresent	 ﾠour	 ﾠactually	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠmost	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠor	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIts	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠwe	 ﾠactually	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdeliberation,	 ﾠits	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“forming”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“acquiring”	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
characterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“stored”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“standing”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
picture	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠis	 ﾠfinished	 ﾠas	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠinstalled	 ﾠ(unless,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
begins	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberation).9	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠPT,	 ﾠour	 ﾠagency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
get	 ﾠno	 ﾠnearer	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠtouch	 ﾠthem	 ﾠat	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠedges.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠour	 ﾠagency	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoo-ﾭ‐extrinsic	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfoundation	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agency	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠSee	 ﾠPeacocke	 ﾠ1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ90;	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠ2005,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ508;	 ﾠCassam	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ81-ﾭ‐2.	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠI	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§4.	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdeliberates	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠmust	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdvocates	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠher	 ﾠattention	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
first-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthey	 ﾠadmit	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠat	 ﾠany	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠaccomplishes	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
deliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠmade	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption,	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorists	 ﾠmust	 ﾠlook	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠitself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠor	 ﾠevents	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfocus,	 ﾠnaturally	 ﾠenough,	 ﾠon	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠevents	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠand	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠover	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexclusive	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠphenomena	 ﾠ
distorts	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination,	 ﾠand	 ﾠgives	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠsections	 ﾠ(§§3-ﾭ‐4)	 ﾠdevelop	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠConstraint	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTemporal	 ﾠStructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠDoxastic	 ﾠAgency	 ﾠ
3.1	 ﾠ To	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfacing	 ﾠPT,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠsome	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠby	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠAuthority	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Estrangement	 ﾠ(2001).	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠhas	 ﾠdone	 ﾠas	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠauthor	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠphilosophical	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠup	 ﾠour	 ﾠminds,”	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠinforms	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
relation	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
observations	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠset	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSeeing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠappreciate	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠframework	 ﾠestablished	 ﾠby	 ﾠPT,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccount.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.2	 ﾠ Moran’s	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠits	 ﾠdeparture	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
am	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠby	 ﾠanswering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠasked	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠmind	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrain	 ﾠtomorrow),	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠby	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmind-ﾭ‐independent	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
obtains	 ﾠ(viz.,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrain	 ﾠtomorrow).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠface	 ﾠof	 ﾠit,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ“transparency”	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠat	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠis	 ﾠpuzzling:	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthere	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠrequires,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠstand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
whose	 ﾠstate	 ﾠit	 ﾠis,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠa	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠother	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠaffairs?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠinvokes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmind:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
What	 ﾠright	 ﾠhave	 ﾠI	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠsubject-ﾭ‐matter)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠanything	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactual	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(which	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsubject-ﾭ‐matter)?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ…	 ﾠ	 ﾠ[M]y	 ﾠthought	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
is:	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ[for	 ﾠP]	 ﾠ	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ…	 ﾠis,	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠthose	 ﾠ
reasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Moran	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ405)	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpassage,	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
determines	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠElsewhere,	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
intelligible	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠamounts	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
[O]nly	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsee	 ﾠmy	 ﾠown	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠsomehow	 ﾠ‘up	 ﾠto	 ﾠme’	 ﾠwill	 ﾠit	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
answer	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠby	 ﾠreflecting	 ﾠexclusively	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠvery	 ﾠthing,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobject	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(Moran	 ﾠ2001,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ66-ﾭ‐7)	 ﾠ
For,	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠargues,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
transparent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠentitled	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠ
conclude	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
assume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“up	 ﾠto	 ﾠme”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Moran,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠof	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“making	 ﾠup	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠjudge,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠset	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠagency	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠputs	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
related	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠmust	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconclusion:	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠput	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠnamely,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠshows	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcommitments	 ﾠundertaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
deliberation	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠ“matters	 ﾠof	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠfact,”	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠcould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠparts	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthus	 ﾠsummarize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ
Moran’s	 ﾠConstraint	 ﾠ(MC):	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
My	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠput	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.10	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Three	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠcomment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstated	 ﾠMC	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit,	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhinge	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠgives	 ﾠus	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠweaker	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠstatus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠPT	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠ
specifically	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠPT	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
proposition	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠI	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow,	 ﾠor	 ﾠjustifiably	 ﾠ
believe,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhatever.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Secondly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning’s	 ﾠ“putting	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition”	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠ
clarification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthis	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠactually	 ﾠform	 ﾠany	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMC	 ﾠsays,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠeven	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠQ	 ﾠand	 ﾠresolve	 ﾠit	 ﾠby	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠof	 ﾠherself	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠepistemic	 ﾠposition	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠno	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠknowledgeably	 ﾠto	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ
Q.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabsence	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠframe	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠI	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconvention	 ﾠof	 ﾠusing	 ﾠquotation	 ﾠmarks	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelements	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Obviously	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhere	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspoken	 ﾠor	 ﾠwritten	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpropositional	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠsees	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠway	 ﾠmarked	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“so”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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even	 ﾠif	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠconcepts	 ﾠshe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠactually	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ–	 ﾠif	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠis	 ﾠright	 ﾠ–	 ﾠshe	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠwere	 ﾠshe	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Finally,	 ﾠI	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠqualification	 ﾠ“normally”	 ﾠin	 ﾠMC	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠcases	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
Peacocke’s	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠapplication	 ﾠreviewer	 ﾠand	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman’s	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠflyer:	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠdeliberates	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠbut	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
grounds	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠexists.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
cases	 ﾠare	 ﾠpossible;	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
immediately	 ﾠbe	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠ
its	 ﾠown	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠought	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠactually	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ
fails	 ﾠby	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠif	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠno	 ﾠlasting	 ﾠimpression	 ﾠon	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
MC	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmust	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠgo	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠgo	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
deliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠown	 ﾠimplicit	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠnormality	 ﾠat	 ﾠissue	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠnormative,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
subject’s	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcome	 ﾠapart	 ﾠare	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexist	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠcan	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠmake	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
question.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠalienated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhis	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠof	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠbiased	 ﾠreviewer	 ﾠand	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Velleman’s	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠflyer	 ﾠare	 ﾠlocally	 ﾠalienated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠstanding	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠliterally	 ﾠ
possessed	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstandpoints	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld,	 ﾠone	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠanother	 ﾠ
governing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠ
deliberation,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠon	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠreferring	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠ“I”	 ﾠboth	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠon	 ﾠthings	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠjudgments,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠone	 ﾠembodied	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMC	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmust	 ﾠobtain,	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfactual	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠdisputed,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠa	 ﾠfact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvicinity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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account	 ﾠ–	 ﾠa	 ﾠfact	 ﾠexhibited	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠreadiness,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”,	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
hesitation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠif	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠto	 ﾠcite	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ground	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠconclusion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.3	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠat	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠappear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠConstraint	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmet	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠvariety	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
accounts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠactually	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠPT	 ﾠand	 ﾠmotivate	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamentally	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Consider	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠPT	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠobservations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Moran	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠour	 ﾠ“transparent”	 ﾠ
knowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠjust	 ﾠin	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPhilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
conceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠmust	 ﾠregard	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠsignificance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgrant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMoran	 ﾠaccurately	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠone	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠdeliberates	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠsince	 ﾠPT	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
exercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠmany	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠknow	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdeliberating,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠadvocates	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠshould	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Moran’s	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠindeed,	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠalong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlines	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
PT	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtended	 ﾠto	 ﾠreact	 ﾠto	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠ
Moran	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransparency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP:	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcan	 ﾠassay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
mind	 ﾠby	 ﾠposing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠspontaneously	 ﾠ
inclined	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocedure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠserves	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠ
applied	 ﾠto	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠeliciting	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponse.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
know	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠalready	 ﾠthinks	 ﾠby	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠsays…	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠ
requires	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefrain	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠany	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠassay.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠasking	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrute	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvitation	 ﾠto	 ﾠreasoning.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠof	 ﾠjust	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠinvitation.	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ506-ﾭ‐507)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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The	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman	 ﾠemphasize	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠfeature	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT:	 ﾠits	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠwe	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠonly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthose	 ﾠoccasions	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnow	 ﾠreflectively	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠreflection,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠcloser	 ﾠexamination,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠshould	 ﾠseem	 ﾠsuspect,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠshould	 ﾠmake	 ﾠus	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠPT	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠforce	 ﾠof	 ﾠMoran’s	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠour	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ One	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuspicion	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠout	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman’s	 ﾠ
characterization	 ﾠof	 ﾠasking	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠone	 ﾠ“already	 ﾠbelieves”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠto	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠ“for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠpurpose	 ﾠof	 ﾠeliciting	 ﾠa	 ﾠresponse.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠTheir	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠI	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhold	 ﾠin	 ﾠabeyance	 ﾠmy	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠPT,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠcase	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠelicit	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ“stored”	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠput	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠstimulus	 ﾠto	 ﾠelicit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstored	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠnow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassessment,	 ﾠjust	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠopen	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠme	 ﾠnow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠI	 ﾠhad	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠentered	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnotebook	 ﾠof	 ﾠtruths	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
keep	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmyself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠrecalling	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠmust	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcommittal	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠrecall	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠunless	 ﾠI	 ﾠrecall	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠnow	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠto	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcall	 ﾠto	 ﾠmind	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpast	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
my	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠstrikes	 ﾠme	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠcorrect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠPT	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
assessment,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠits	 ﾠinsistence	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠoccurrent,	 ﾠforward-ﾭ‐looking	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
assessment,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexercised,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
stored	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠpast	 ﾠassessments,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠexpress,	 ﾠif	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠa	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠtrace	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠ
determination	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Another	 ﾠindication	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠplays	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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in	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠdeliberated	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
not.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠperson	 ﾠfaced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠalways	 ﾠhave	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
holding	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠthing	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠto	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠ
grounds,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresupposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠ
poor,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠadmits	 ﾠto	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠno	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠare	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠrequired,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠready	 ﾠto	 ﾠcriticize	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠsignificantly,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠour	 ﾠcriticisms	 ﾠto	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠask	 ﾠhim	 ﾠ
why	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠso	 ﾠoutlandish,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanifestly	 ﾠunreasonable	 ﾠ
argument,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠnone)	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
posture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠhis	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
throughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduration	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠdeliberated	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠseem,	 ﾠin	 ﾠshort,	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpressive	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠby	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdeems	 ﾠrelevant.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Could	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefender	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠaccommodate	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠby	 ﾠnoting	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠdeliberation,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠrecall	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠresulted	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠpast	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
reasons,	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase	 ﾠnow	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠexercising	 ﾠagency	 ﾠover	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠbeginning	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
deliberate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠeither	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠcould	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intimacy	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠand	 ﾠanswerability	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠthat	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠ
here.12	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠwhy?-ﾭ‐question	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinquire	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcoming,	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠpast	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠinsofar	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠcame	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠspeaks	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠit	 ﾠnow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠ
interest	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠhistory,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠconviction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠshall	 ﾠhenceforth	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP;	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠare	 ﾠcredible.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠof	 ﾠnonlinguistic	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠor	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThroughout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdiscussion,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
claims	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠread	 ﾠas	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠto	 ﾠsubjects	 ﾠwho	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeliberate	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudge.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsketch	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠthought	 ﾠdeveloped	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠin	 ﾠBoyle	 ﾠForthcoming	 ﾠ(1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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we	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ
him	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠ
hold	 ﾠhim	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmanner	 ﾠof	 ﾠsomeone	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdo	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
situation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠheld	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmisbehavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠchild,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplosion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
munitions	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbasement.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠallowing	 ﾠan	 ﾠunreasonable	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
persist,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠpreviously	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠinto	 ﾠexistence;	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠ
accountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠnow	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthus-ﾭ‐and-ﾭ‐so,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠme.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
merely	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠPT	 ﾠ
implies	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbut	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠis	 ﾠactually	 ﾠ
presently	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
3.4	 ﾠ So	 ﾠfar,	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠraising	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠdoubts	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠPT	 ﾠrecognizes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠPT	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠto	 ﾠmind	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠone	 ﾠalready	 ﾠholds	 ﾠto	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠarrives	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
deliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠRecall	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMC	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠput	 ﾠher	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠproposition:	 ﾠ
(C)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
Can	 ﾠa	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorist	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ There	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠout	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(C).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Consider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtenses	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsentences	 ﾠbound	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“because”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(C):	 ﾠthey	 ﾠboth	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmere	 ﾠaccident	 ﾠof	 ﾠformulation;	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠmean	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠquite	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
(C*)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
(C*)	 ﾠclaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠby	 ﾠreference	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpast	 ﾠsituation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠto	 ﾠread	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠoffering	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠanalogous	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
(E)	 ﾠ The	 ﾠred	 ﾠbilliard	 ﾠball	 ﾠis	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhite	 ﾠbilliard	 ﾠball	 ﾠstruck	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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But	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠdecidedly	 ﾠodd:	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠelse?	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠimagine	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠapt	 ﾠ–	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcount	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠMaxwell’s	 ﾠequations	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠprinciples	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
electromagnetism	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠidea	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphysics.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠon	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(C),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠin	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠup	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinctive	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠfeatures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠout	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
implication	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(C*):	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠidea	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠphysics	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠtendency	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ
anything	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectromagnetism.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠ(C*)	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpurport	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
capture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠQ	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue:	 ﾠit	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠasserts	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
contributed	 ﾠto	 ﾠits	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠso	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠread	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
intended	 ﾠway,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠpurport	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠQ	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue:	 ﾠit	 ﾠsays	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠconvinces	 ﾠhim	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠmay	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmistaken,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠhis	 ﾠconviction.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
explain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠboth	 ﾠclauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠonly	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
direct	 ﾠbearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnow	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠP	 ﾠthen	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠan	 ﾠindirect	 ﾠbearing:	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas,	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠreliable	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠaccepted	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
propositions	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgood	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠask	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
bears	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠP	 ﾠthen	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
ask	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠare	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorist	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠreconcile	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠ
structural	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠcommits	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtension	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
help	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠseparate	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠvariants	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠdistinguished	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§2.1:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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3.5	 ﾠ On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠ(henceforth:	 ﾠCPT),	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠis	 ﾠstraightforward.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠP	 ﾠthen	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠI	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠat	 ﾠtime	 ﾠt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠcause	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ
precede	 ﾠits	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠso	 ﾠif	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠQ	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcause	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠafter	 ﾠt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠmy	 ﾠthen	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠQ?	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠpsychological	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠare,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
seems,	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpast:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproximate	 ﾠcause	 ﾠis	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠQ	 ﾠat	 ﾠt,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠremote	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠI	 ﾠheld	 ﾠat	 ﾠt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgave	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGiven	 ﾠthese	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(C).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠsense	 ﾠcan	 ﾠI	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP?	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠmay	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠpersist,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠwere	 ﾠchanged,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠactual	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠis	 ﾠentailed	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreasoned	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠ–	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠconceives	 ﾠit	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠat	 ﾠt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠthen	 ﾠcould	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠP	 ﾠthen	 ﾠQ:	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠit	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlater	 ﾠleave	 ﾠme	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ?	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠdo	 ﾠI	 ﾠknow	 ﾠI	 ﾠwon’t	 ﾠreceive	 ﾠ
new	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠchange	 ﾠmy	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave?	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠact	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinstall	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠprecedes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠactually	 ﾠexists,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠleast	 ﾠlogically	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreevaluated	 ﾠ
whatever	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠarises.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠacting	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠinstall	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠbet,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
possess	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimmediate	 ﾠand	 ﾠunproblematic	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ
intuitively	 ﾠpossesses.13	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠafter	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠwere	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠA	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconstrued	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“process	 ﾠrequirements”	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
been	 ﾠraised	 ﾠby	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠBroome	 ﾠ(2007,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ368).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBroome	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠdeliberative	 ﾠtransition:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
considers	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠI	 ﾠought	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠA,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠto	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠintending	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠA.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠhe	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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reasonableness	 ﾠdepended	 ﾠon	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠviews	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠa	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠcould	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠas	 ﾠwholly	 ﾠunproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠought,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems,	 ﾠto	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
step	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠas	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhis	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
accepting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠor	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠinference.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠwe	 ﾠentertain	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
doubt:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠby	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠP	 ﾠthen	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
Q”	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ;	 ﾠwe	 ﾠregard	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstep	 ﾠas	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠirreproachable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠour	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnew	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠwill	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelapses	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠcomplications	 ﾠinto	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
account	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ This	 ﾠcriticism	 ﾠmay	 ﾠseem	 ﾠunfair	 ﾠto	 ﾠCPT.14	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠbeings	 ﾠ
accumulate	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠit	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
possible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠin	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠat	 ﾠone	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
forming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠoften	 ﾠretain	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠlong	 ﾠ
after	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠforgotten	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠwe	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠhad	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠin	 ﾠretaining	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠbasing	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
deprived	 ﾠof	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccumulated	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworld.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠit	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
objectionable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠto	 ﾠposit	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠa	 ﾠlater	 ﾠbelief?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ It	 ﾠis	 ﾠundeniable	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠwho	 ﾠreason	 ﾠand	 ﾠaccumulate	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
routinely	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠTyler	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠhas	 ﾠcalled	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“preservative”	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠmemory,	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
making	 ﾠhere:	 ﾠmy	 ﾠnow	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠmy	 ﾠsubsequently,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
rationally,	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠview.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠreason	 ﾠcan	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
determine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlater	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Broome’s	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠforms	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠthought-ﾭ‐provoking	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠwith	 ﾠNiko	 ﾠKolodny	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠan	 ﾠexchange	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠraises	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠissues	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpractical	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠup	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnote	 ﾠin	 ﾠpassing	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠauthors,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠall	 ﾠrational	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠare	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠare	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
what	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ“going	 ﾠforward”	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠKolodny	 ﾠputs	 ﾠit),	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgranted	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠto	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠis	 ﾠactive	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠhis	 ﾠown	 ﾠattitudes,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠcarried	 ﾠout	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
14	 ﾠI	 ﾠowe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠanonymous	 ﾠreader.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 21	 ﾠ
contents	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠheld	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠat	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠtime	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠheld	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlater	 ﾠ
time,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠretaining	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠdefault.15	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠour	 ﾠentitlement	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreliance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠposited	 ﾠby	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“simple	 ﾠ
preservation,”	 ﾠI	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠlater	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠP	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmemory	 ﾠkeeps	 ﾠme	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠrapport	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠor	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠno	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠhere	 ﾠdo	 ﾠI	 ﾠact	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠpsychology	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnow:	 ﾠI	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠ
reasonably	 ﾠbelieved.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠposited	 ﾠby	 ﾠCPT,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠI	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
(apparent)	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠnow	 ﾠpossess,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠonly	 ﾠlater	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSince	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠfor	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmy	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
grounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠP	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠany	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhere	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠreasonably	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcogency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreasonableness	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠof	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠpreservation,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtime	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallows	 ﾠme	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠneeding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠinvoke	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠpremises	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistory	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcontents.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠ
posited	 ﾠby	 ﾠCPT,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjustification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstep	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠit,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
accepting	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠI	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠpossess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠforward-ﾭ‐looking	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐manipulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠ
complications	 ﾠinto	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠinference	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠraised	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠfor	 ﾠCPT:	 ﾠone	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasoning,	 ﾠand	 ﾠanother	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠits	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrationality	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
15	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠ1993,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ463-ﾭ‐5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBurge	 ﾠargues	 ﾠforcefully	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠa	 ﾠpriori	 ﾠentitlement	 ﾠto	 ﾠrely	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠcontents	 ﾠpreserved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway,	 ﾠan	 ﾠentitlement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
justification	 ﾠfor	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcontents,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠpreserves	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠjustification-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠthey	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠ
possessed.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠframed	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠas	 ﾠobjections,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexpressed,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmodestly,	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
challenges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠadequate	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmeet.	 ﾠ	 ﾠDiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
deliberation,	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠgive	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporal	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactivities,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠspeaking,	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠcasually,	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠevents	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbring	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠresults.16	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠshown	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠnatural	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠlanguage	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠchallenge	 ﾠ–	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠfor	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠ
Theorists,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanyone	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠleave	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠefficacy	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠ
explanatorily	 ﾠcounterintuitive	 ﾠand	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.6	 ﾠ Turn	 ﾠnow	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐causal	 ﾠvariant	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠ(henceforth:	 ﾠNCPT),	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Q	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcause	 ﾠmy	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠor	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠQ.17	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠso	 ﾠas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠappear	 ﾠto	 ﾠoverlook	 ﾠan	 ﾠoption	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠ
Theorists,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠmy	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠis	 ﾠunclear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
many	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“forming”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“acquiring”	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠreflection,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorist	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be:	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠuseful	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠor	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠhe	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠthroughout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠduration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠtime),	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“making	 ﾠup	 ﾠhis	 ﾠmind”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“forming”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠP,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
question.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠmay	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠexpressing	 ﾠto	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠP	 ﾠby	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠreason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
occur	 ﾠas	 ﾠsoon	 ﾠas	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthing	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
16	 ﾠAn	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠexception	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠSoteriou	 ﾠ(2005,	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠSoteriou’s	 ﾠviews	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetail	 ﾠ
here,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhis	 ﾠsuggestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“acquiring”	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠreceives	 ﾠsome	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§3.6.	 ﾠ
17	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠanonymous	 ﾠreader	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠme	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproposal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 23	 ﾠ
looking	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠsettles	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠquestion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠit	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠsettled.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Suppose,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠ
during	 ﾠhis	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠtime),	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproposal	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“forming”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“acquiring”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠdiffers	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠCPT.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠbegin,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠto	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠapply	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell:	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠturns	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
affect	 ﾠmy	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠpsychology,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠseems	 ﾠboth	 ﾠintuitively	 ﾠ
wrong	 ﾠand	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠproblematic.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠjust	 ﾠposed	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠabout	 ﾠevents	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstopping	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠauthors.18	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠsome	 ﾠobject	 ﾠ
O	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠask,	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠM	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠO	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠO	 ﾠis	 ﾠor	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠat	 ﾠM,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprima	 ﾠfacie	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠabout	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
answer	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠwill	 ﾠarise,	 ﾠmutatis	 ﾠmutandis,	 ﾠconcerning	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠO	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠto	 ﾠrest	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠunsound	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠof	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠand	 ﾠstopping,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠ
follows	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpresented,19	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagenda	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthis	 ﾠclaim,	 ﾠor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmy	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠposed	 ﾠabove	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠout	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
constraint	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment:	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccur	 ﾠat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
moment	 ﾠin	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
occurrence,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠour	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠoccurrence	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
My	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconstraint	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorist,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
18	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠMedlin	 ﾠ1963,	 ﾠHamblin	 ﾠ1969.	 ﾠ
19	 ﾠAny	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠwould	 ﾠpresumably	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠand	 ﾠstopping	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠconceive	 ﾠof	 ﾠevents	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠontology	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
ambition	 ﾠof	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠactively	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠexist	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
event,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠforming	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠbut	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠ
formed	 ﾠone,	 ﾠor	 ﾠelse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠevent	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠway	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠby	 ﾠCPT,	 ﾠa	 ﾠway	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠseen	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠproblematic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ If	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“acquiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief”	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcoincides	 ﾠwith	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠconsciousness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearliest	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
believing	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠnothing	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠtells	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠrecognizing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠevents.20	 ﾠ	 ﾠNor	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠanything	 ﾠ
I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠto	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠevents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠconstitute	 ﾠan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠan	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠby	 ﾠtalk	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“forming	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief,”	 ﾠa	 ﾠphrase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠproductive	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠtempted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠforming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠsubstitute	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠact	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠplace	 ﾠout	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
consider	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠmake	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠaccomplishing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
accomplish.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠfinish	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠby	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠ
aloud:	 ﾠ“P!”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠan	 ﾠact,	 ﾠand	 ﾠone	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠperform	 ﾠintentionally,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠit	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ“P!”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠall	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠintended	 ﾠby	 ﾠsome	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcharacterize	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“acquiring	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠof	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠformulations,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠconceives	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudging,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠI	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠone	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠ(normally)	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠto	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Thus	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwrites	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“when	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠknowledgeable	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐ascriptions	 ﾠ[of	 ﾠbelief]	 ﾠtrack	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
property	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠreason:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠreached	 ﾠare	 ﾠones	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthinker’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbelief”	 ﾠ(1998,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ89).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠ
properly,	 ﾠone	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠjudge	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(which,	 ﾠon	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠview,	 ﾠis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠof	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠ
P)	 ﾠunless	 ﾠone	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠ(though	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠwant	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠresist	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠepistemically	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
believes	 ﾠP).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠview,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
him,	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠ“will,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠall	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠinitiation	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcontinuation)	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
P”	 ﾠ(Ibid.).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠexpresses	 ﾠan	 ﾠextant	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠare	 ﾠworking	 ﾠproperly,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠneither	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠit	 ﾠ“continue”	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠif	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmeans:	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠcontinues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠperformed	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
belief,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠconsciousness	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠour	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠopen:	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠagential	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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expressing	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠalready	 ﾠbelieve;	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ“P!”	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠconviction,	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠdoing	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠcircumstances	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
genuinely	 ﾠconcluded	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdeliberation,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠview	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
true.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠinwardly	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠoutwardly	 ﾠsaying	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheorist	 ﾠto	 ﾠescape	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdilemma.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoherent	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠ
event,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconception,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclear	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“making	 ﾠup	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
mind.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠone	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠoneself,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠCPT	 ﾠensue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠ	 ﾠProcessive	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠ
4.1	 ﾠ At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠact	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠor	 ﾠunfolds	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠpersists	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdeliberation,	 ﾠ
judgment	 ﾠand	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFull	 ﾠProcess	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠrespecting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠassumption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
account,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠattendant	 ﾠdifficulties,	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠquestioned	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠthat	 ﾠunderlies	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMight	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠmanifested	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpersistence	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠstate?	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠShowing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠ
responding	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠPT	 ﾠseem	 ﾠunavoidable	 ﾠand	 ﾠarticulating	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
alternative	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
former	 ﾠtask;	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsection	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.2	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ§2.2,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthree	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT:	 ﾠfirst,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
deliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠappears	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠengage	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠon	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠoccasions,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbelieve;	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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second,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo;	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠ
P	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠfail	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠone	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠthink	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠdecides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠus	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdo	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠtreated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmental	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠ
Searle	 ﾠwrites:	 ﾠ
Acts	 ﾠare	 ﾠthings	 ﾠone	 ﾠdoes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠ‘What	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠnow	 ﾠ
doing?’	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠgoes,	 ﾠ‘I	 ﾠam	 ﾠnow	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrain’…	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(1983,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠ
Now,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠ“I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP”	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“What	 ﾠare	 ﾠyou	 ﾠdoing?”,	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠhere	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
continuous	 ﾠtense,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠbelieve”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstative	 ﾠverb	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠascribed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontinuous	 ﾠ
tense.21	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠone	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrule	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agency	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠoccurrent	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠI	 ﾠhope	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
argue:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠoccurrently	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgenus	 ﾠact,	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agency.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsettled	 ﾠbelief?	 ﾠ	 ﾠDoes	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠsucceed,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠI	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠstored	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠmyself?	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠCases	 ﾠlike	 ﾠthose	 ﾠof	 ﾠPeacocke’s	 ﾠ
biased	 ﾠapplication-ﾭ‐reviewer	 ﾠand	 ﾠShah	 ﾠand	 ﾠVelleman’s	 ﾠfearful	 ﾠflyer	 ﾠare	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠpossible,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthem	 ﾠas	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠP	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
P.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠuncontentious	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcases	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠjudges	 ﾠP	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠdescribe	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠfails	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
produce	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠPT	 ﾠin	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠdescription	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠprove	 ﾠPT	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠof	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
21	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠdo”	 ﾠappears	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmain	 ﾠverb	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsentence	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠan	 ﾠauxiliary	 ﾠverb,	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“Do	 ﾠyou	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsaid?”),	 ﾠonly	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐stative	 ﾠverbs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠreplace	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ“to	 ﾠ
do”	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneric	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠverb	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠaspectual	 ﾠmodifiers	 ﾠ(is	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ing,	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐ed),	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠstative	 ﾠverbs	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
receive	 ﾠaspectual	 ﾠmodification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNo	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency-ﾭ‐status	 ﾠof	 ﾠstative	 ﾠverbs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
activeness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodes	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthey	 ﾠascribe,	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
mediated	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠof	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgrammatical	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠto	 ﾠit.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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An	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠinterpretation,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠproposed	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§3.6,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
interpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠto	 ﾠreview	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠ“Air	 ﾠtravel	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
statistically	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠsafer	 ﾠthan	 ﾠtravel	 ﾠby	 ﾠcar,”	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠfirming	 ﾠup	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠdoesn’t	 ﾠsucceed,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠ
conclusive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcast	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠcome	 ﾠinto	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠexists	 ﾠ(albeit	 ﾠ
perhaps	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠonly	 ﾠjust	 ﾠnow	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠroot).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.3	 ﾠ This	 ﾠleaves	 ﾠus	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠconsideration	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
deliberation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠengage	 ﾠat	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscretion,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
concludes	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠformerly	 ﾠdid	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠI	 ﾠdeliberate,	 ﾠI	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaim	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠextent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠreasonable,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtake	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠ(reasoning	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbear	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠmaking	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠinquiries,	 ﾠemploying	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠheuristics,	 ﾠetc.)	 ﾠ
calculated	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠif	 ﾠI	 ﾠdo	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠmy	 ﾠforming	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠor	 ﾠreconfirming	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠI	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
hold).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠseems	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive,	 ﾠgoal-ﾭ‐directed	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ(when	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠgo	 ﾠwell)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠI	 ﾠhold.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠdispute	 ﾠthese	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠobservations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider,	 ﾠthough,	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠlight	 ﾠthey	 ﾠshed	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
process,	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠsignificance:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmust	 ﾠsuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
beliefs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplicated	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠactively	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠ
closer	 ﾠconsideration,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠdoubt	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
agency	 ﾠcan	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠphenomenon	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ To	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠcare	 ﾠabout	 ﾠjust	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠa	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠgoverns,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠso.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠthings	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐governed	 ﾠactions	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠunproblematic	 ﾠenough	 ﾠsense	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠany	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠas	 ﾠunproblematic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠpurposes).	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
telephone	 ﾠa	 ﾠknowledgeable	 ﾠfriend,	 ﾠor	 ﾠboot	 ﾠup	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcomputer	 ﾠand	 ﾠtype	 ﾠa	 ﾠquery	 ﾠinto	 ﾠWikipedia,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
write	 ﾠdown	 ﾠa	 ﾠlist	 ﾠof	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠconsiderations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
performing	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠepistemically-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpointing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfact	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
yet	 ﾠclarify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠactions	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠbring	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP:	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠputting	 ﾠmyself	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
circumstances	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ(I	 ﾠsuppose)	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
me.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThey	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠof	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠgrounds.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ If	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠway	 ﾠ–	 ﾠby	 ﾠactively	 ﾠputting	 ﾠ
ourselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠstimulated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
operate,	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠremain	 ﾠunclear	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠany	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠof	 ﾠprinciple	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠ
stomachaches	 ﾠor	 ﾠphobias.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAfter	 ﾠall,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdisposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠform	 ﾠand	 ﾠretain	 ﾠthese	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠstates	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠintentional	 ﾠactions	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠstates	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠperforming	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsurely	 ﾠan	 ﾠintuitive	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
govern	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠstomachache	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP:	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠformer	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠbest	 ﾠindirect,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
wants	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdirect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠintuition	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsettling	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠcan	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
expressed	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfree	 ﾠ“judgment”,	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“make	 ﾠup	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠminds.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠagency:	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠagency	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
answer	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠagency	 ﾠI	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactually	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
question,	 ﾠor	 ﾠsuspending	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠit,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠreasons.22	 ﾠ	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠsquarely	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthis	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠhow	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠactively	 ﾠ
governing	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠbring	 ﾠthis	 ﾠout,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠour	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠmundane	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠan	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠI	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
armchair	 ﾠlooks	 ﾠbad	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠspot,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠgo	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchange	 ﾠby	 ﾠintentionally	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdesired	 ﾠlocation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ(my	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchair	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠhere	 ﾠto	 ﾠthere)	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠpropositions	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
(1)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠam	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmchair	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom.	 ﾠ
And	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeventually,	 ﾠif	 ﾠthings	 ﾠgo	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
(2)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmchair	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ“am	 ﾠmoving”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“moved”	 ﾠin	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshift	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprogressive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
perfect	 ﾠ–	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth-ﾭ‐conditions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpropositions.23	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠand	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnever	 ﾠcome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue:	 ﾠI	 ﾠmight,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance,	 ﾠsuffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠheart	 ﾠattack	 ﾠ
midway	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠ	 ﾠStill,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠeternity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
misfortune	 ﾠ
(3)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠwas	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmchair	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom.	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtruth	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠonce	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpast.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ(3)	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
having	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠsteps	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠview	 ﾠto	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠarmchair	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠroom,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
achieved	 ﾠmy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠI	 ﾠactively	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
22	 ﾠSome	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠagency	 ﾠat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠa	 ﾠworking	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ
–	 ﾠone	 ﾠI	 ﾠtake	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠshared	 ﾠby	 ﾠdefenders	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠagency.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPhilosophers	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthis	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
often	 ﾠmotivated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthought	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrecognizing	 ﾠagency	 ﾠhere	 ﾠwould	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠsupposing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
will.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpremature	 ﾠto	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency	 ﾠon	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
considering	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsome	 ﾠother	 ﾠsense	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmade	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmy	 ﾠproject	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
lay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgroundwork	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐voluntaristic	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuncritical	 ﾠ
acceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠPT	 ﾠis	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprevents	 ﾠus	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdone.	 ﾠ
23	 ﾠThis	 ﾠshift	 ﾠcorresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlinguist’s	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠcontrasting	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠverbal	 ﾠ“aspect”:	 ﾠ
imperfective	 ﾠand	 ﾠperfective.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠaspect,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠComrie	 ﾠ1976	 ﾠand	 ﾠGalton	 ﾠ1984,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
helpful	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠmind	 ﾠand	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠMourelatos	 ﾠ
1978,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠon	 ﾠclassic	 ﾠdiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠin	 ﾠVendler	 ﾠ1957	 ﾠand	 ﾠKenny	 ﾠ1963.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠapply:	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠaims	 ﾠto	 ﾠbring	 ﾠabout,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠits	 ﾠaim	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠunderway	 ﾠ
but	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠits	 ﾠaim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIndeed,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠabout,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsituation	 ﾠI	 ﾠaim	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠbegun	 ﾠto	 ﾠact	 ﾠon	 ﾠit,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalready	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠmy	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
finished.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠintervening	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
true	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorresponding	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠform	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠchange	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠits	 ﾠrealization	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠspans	 ﾠa	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠbounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
last	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠstate	 ﾠobtains	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠ
change	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompleted,	 ﾠor	 ﾠis	 ﾠbroken	 ﾠoff	 ﾠincomplete.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠto	 ﾠnotice	 ﾠabout	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠ
describe	 ﾠit	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠaim	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelements	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠactively-ﾭ‐governed	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠor	 ﾠevents	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠseen	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlight	 ﾠof	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠgrounds.24	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthis	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠ(judging,	 ﾠ
accepting,	 ﾠsettling	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠ…)	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠ
characterized	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠreached,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠdirected	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
act	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠit	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠproposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠcould	 ﾠit	 ﾠmean	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
bringing	 ﾠit	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP?	 ﾠ	 ﾠEither	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠstill	 ﾠundecided	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
case	 ﾠI	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠ“start	 ﾠjudging”	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠany	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠI	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠat	 ﾠwill;	 ﾠor	 ﾠelse	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
already	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠdefinite	 ﾠattitude	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠP,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcase	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ The	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠmy	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
24	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexercised,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠconclusion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠphases	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
deliberative	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠweighs	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠof	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠconsiderations,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
draws	 ﾠsome	 ﾠsubordinate	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐conclusion,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠone	 ﾠrefrains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠreaching	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠone	 ﾠ
judges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠsettle	 ﾠit,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsimplicity	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
conclusion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠapply	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠexercises	 ﾠof	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠassessment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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about	 ﾠthat	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠno	 ﾠtime	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠengaged	 ﾠin	 ﾠrealizing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠresult	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresult	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcome	 ﾠabout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠtime	 ﾠmay	 ﾠpass	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlead-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠto	 ﾠmy	 ﾠdetermining	 ﾠmy	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠI	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠoccupy	 ﾠmy	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠmy	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠitself	 ﾠtake	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
first	 ﾠinstant	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinstant	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠone	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠ
forming	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP;	 ﾠit	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠmy	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
point.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠjudging	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP	 ﾠis,	 ﾠif	 ﾠanything,	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠ
resolved,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠbring	 ﾠresolution	 ﾠabout.25	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ If	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠright,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠactively	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Perhaps	 ﾠdeliberation	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠacquisition	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠevent	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoccurs	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbear	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
weight	 ﾠthat	 ﾠPT	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbear.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠour	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠgoverning	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠitself	 ﾠconsists	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
processes	 ﾠor	 ﾠevents	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠactively	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠour	 ﾠown	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
determination	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtake	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠform.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.	 ﾠ	 ﾠConclusion:	 ﾠBeliefs	 ﾠas	 ﾠActs	 ﾠof	 ﾠReason	 ﾠ
5.1	 ﾠ The	 ﾠarguments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreceding	 ﾠsections	 ﾠconverge	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠconclusion:	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠpossess	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexercised	 ﾠin	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠbelief-ﾭ‐state,	 ﾠinstalling	 ﾠnew	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠones.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
led	 ﾠsome	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠto	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
said	 ﾠto	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠover	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbelieve.26	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠapparent	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
locate	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstalling	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠelse	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
25	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠof	 ﾠ§3.6,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtemporality	 ﾠof	 ﾠjudgment,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠGeach	 ﾠ
1957,	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ101-ﾭ‐106	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoteriou	 ﾠ2009,	 ﾠp.	 ﾠ238.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
26	 ﾠSee	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠStrawson	 ﾠ2003,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠpp.	 ﾠ231-ﾭ‐3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠStrawson’s	 ﾠview,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBoyle	 ﾠ
Forthcoming	 ﾠ(1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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doxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavoidable	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwere	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠ
another	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠactively	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠthings	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠactively	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ To	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“actively	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠway”	 ﾠmay	 ﾠsound	 ﾠparadoxical.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠsense	 ﾠcan	 ﾠI	 ﾠ
count	 ﾠas	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determining,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠmy	 ﾠstate,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠin	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcondition?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠoffer	 ﾠa	 ﾠbrief	 ﾠdefense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠ
belief	 ﾠitself	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbring	 ﾠout	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmean,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠintriguing	 ﾠremarks	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠactivity.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.2	 ﾠ In	 ﾠa	 ﾠfamous	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠMetaphysics,	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠkinds	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
actualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ(dunamis,	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“potentiality”).27	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠhe	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠ
kinēsis	 ﾠ(often	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“movement”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“change”):	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠapplies	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
something’s	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠof	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠquality,	 ﾠor	 ﾠquantity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHis	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠare:	 ﾠ
becoming	 ﾠthin,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhealed,	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠlearning	 ﾠsomething),	 ﾠwalking	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠwalking	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
somewhere),	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠsomething).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAny	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠchange,	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠholds,	 ﾠproceeds	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomething:	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠstarts	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠit	 ﾠproceeds.28	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠis	 ﾠcharacterized	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
“incompleteness”	 ﾠ(1048b29):	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠkinēsis	 ﾠis	 ﾠoccurring,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠchange	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠyet	 ﾠ
reached	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠproceeding,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠreached,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinēsis	 ﾠ
itself	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠextant.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ In	 ﾠjust	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠkinēsis	 ﾠcontrasts	 ﾠwith	 ﾠanother	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠ
energeia	 ﾠ(often	 ﾠtranslated	 ﾠas	 ﾠ“activity”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“actuality”).	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠenergeia	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent”:	 ﾠone	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunfolding	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
27	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠin	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠIX.	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ(1048b18-ﾭ‐35),	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠdistinctions	 ﾠare	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠin	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠplaces	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠcorpus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontroversial,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠIX	 ﾠeven	 ﾠbelongs	 ﾠin	 ﾠits	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠ(it	 ﾠis	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠsome	 ﾠmanuscripts).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfollows	 ﾠmust	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadmittedly	 ﾠcontroversial	 ﾠ
précis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠpassage	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontroversies	 ﾠsurrounding	 ﾠit,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
Burnyeat	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
28	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠMetaphysics,	 ﾠIX.	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ1048b18,	 ﾠNicomachean	 ﾠEthics	 ﾠX.	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠ1174b5	 ﾠand	 ﾠPhysics	 ﾠV.	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠ224b35-ﾭ‐225a3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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a	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠproceeding	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠresult,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠbeing,	 ﾠevery	 ﾠ
moment	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcompletion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity.29	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Aristotle’s	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠhere	 ﾠare:	 ﾠseeing,	 ﾠunderstanding,	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠliving	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhappy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEach	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these,	 ﾠhe	 ﾠsuggests,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconceived	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
actualizations	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠare	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠmoment	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠoccurrence,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠare	 ﾠseeing	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠseen,	 ﾠare	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠunderstood,	 ﾠare	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
thought,	 ﾠ…	 ﾠare	 ﾠliving	 ﾠwell	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlived	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠare	 ﾠhappy	 ﾠand	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠhappy”	 ﾠ(1048b23-ﾭ‐
26).30	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Aristotle’s	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠin	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
holds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠare	 ﾠpassive	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdetermined	 ﾠby	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠactive	 ﾠ
capacities	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠsomething.31	 ﾠ	 ﾠVarious	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠon	 ﾠeach	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinēsis-ﾭ‐
energeia	 ﾠdivide	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhealed,	 ﾠseeing)	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexamples	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpassively	 ﾠdetermined,	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠof	 ﾠactive	 ﾠdetermination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbland	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“actualizations”	 ﾠmore	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“acts”	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠlabel	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtopic.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
bearing	 ﾠon	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcapacities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠsound,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
give	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactive-ﾭ‐passive	 ﾠdistinction,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshould	 ﾠleave	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
active	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠenergetic	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharacter:	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconsists,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠbringing	 ﾠabout	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
result,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠmean	 ﾠbecomes	 ﾠclearer	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠattend	 ﾠto	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠexamples.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTake	 ﾠ“living	 ﾠ
well.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠlife	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐lived	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠactions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
29	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠIX.	 ﾠ6,	 ﾠ1048b22.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTranslations	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtext	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠ1984.	 ﾠ
30	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠthus	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠimply	 ﾠthat	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠenergeia	 ﾠjust	 ﾠif	 ﾠits	 ﾠascription	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠverb-ﾭ‐
phrase	 ﾠwith	 ﾠimperfective	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠits	 ﾠascription	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠverb-ﾭ‐phrase	 ﾠwith	 ﾠperfective	 ﾠ
aspect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtest	 ﾠdraws	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠwants	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠcontroversy.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
illuminating	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠAristotle’s	 ﾠmeaning	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠof	 ﾠtranslating	 ﾠhis	 ﾠtest	 ﾠinto	 ﾠEnglish,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
Graham	 ﾠ1980	 ﾠand	 ﾠBurnyeat	 ﾠ2008.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhere	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontroversy	 ﾠby	 ﾠtreating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
diagnostic,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefinitive:	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠour	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconcept	 ﾠof	 ﾠenergeia	 ﾠmust	 ﾠdraw	 ﾠon	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠ
connections	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠideas	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠcompletion,	 ﾠetc.,	 ﾠconnections	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠ
grammatical	 ﾠtest.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkinēsis-ﾭ‐energeia	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠis	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠKosman	 ﾠ1984	 ﾠand	 ﾠ1994.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
31	 ﾠSee	 ﾠMetaphysics	 ﾠIX.	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ1046a9-ﾭ‐20.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠgives	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomplex	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠactive	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
passive	 ﾠcapacities,	 ﾠapplying	 ﾠthis	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkinēsis,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠextending	 ﾠit,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠto	 ﾠenergeiai.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠhis	 ﾠviews	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠissue	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 34	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠliving	 ﾠwell	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠconsist	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
any	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠactions:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠstilted	 ﾠidiom	 ﾠof	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠtranslation,	 ﾠ
“flourishing.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThat	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠcan	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠregarded	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠhe	 ﾠpossesses,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠorganize	 ﾠhis	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpursuits	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconstitutes	 ﾠa	 ﾠbalanced	 ﾠhuman	 ﾠexistence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
ordered	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠend;	 ﾠflourishing	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
living	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠend	 ﾠis	 ﾠachieved:	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠsustains	 ﾠa	 ﾠflourishing	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠ
precisely	 ﾠby	 ﾠorganizing	 ﾠhis	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpursuits	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠmanner.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠliving	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
flourishing	 ﾠlife	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ“in	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠend	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent”:	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠchange	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠrealization	 ﾠcompletes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠa	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐sustaining	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠin	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠit	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
actively	 ﾠmaintained	 ﾠcondition:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠto	 ﾠflourish	 ﾠonly	 ﾠif	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠ
conditions	 ﾠare	 ﾠmet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠground	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠflourishing	 ﾠlies	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠconditions,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠhimself.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Now,	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠknowing,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠas	 ﾠenergeiai.32	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrash	 ﾠto	 ﾠequate	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠAristotle	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠby	 ﾠ“thinking”,	 ﾠ
“knowing”,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“understanding”	 ﾠwith	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠby	 ﾠthese	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNevertheless,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
classification	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuggestive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠraises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdilemma	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠto	 ﾠface	 ﾠ–	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
locate	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstalling	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodifying	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
doxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠ–	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠtoo-ﾭ‐narrow	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠtake.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠrational	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactualized,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠevents	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠof	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
believe	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠ“energetic”	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠholding	 ﾠrationally-ﾭ‐grounded	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠpropositions.33	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
32	 ﾠCompare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremark	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠDe	 ﾠAnima	 ﾠI.	 ﾠ3	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠPhysics	 ﾠVII.	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠesp.	 ﾠ
247b1-ﾭ‐2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
33	 ﾠMy	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“holding”	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcharacter	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠis	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠEngstrom	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠ(pp.	 ﾠ103-ﾭ‐
4),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠattributes	 ﾠto	 ﾠKant	 ﾠa	 ﾠconception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠof	 ﾠreason	 ﾠquite	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠhere.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠquite	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠinvocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbroadly	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplicate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠPink	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 35	 ﾠ
5.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ With	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠin	 ﾠmind,	 ﾠlet	 ﾠus	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠobservation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ”	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠputs	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠan	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠboth	 ﾠexplanandum	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
explanans	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠtense:	 ﾠ
(C)	 ﾠ I	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠQ	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠI	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠtrying	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠmight	 ﾠ
take.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠreflections	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmight	 ﾠregard	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠas	 ﾠitself	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠan	 ﾠact.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠcondition:	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠbasis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
His	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠreasoning,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Regardless	 ﾠ–	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ§3.3	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseem	 ﾠto	 ﾠtreat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠas	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠholds	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhold	 ﾠ
him	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcogency	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠanswer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
certain	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcondition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenergeia	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
he	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠby	 ﾠassessing	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠreflection	 ﾠon	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠ
bears	 ﾠthis	 ﾠout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠreports	 ﾠa	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthings	 ﾠ(1)	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
normally	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ(2)	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠvery	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠhis	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠit	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠway.	 ﾠ	 ﾠLet	 ﾠme	 ﾠsay	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠA	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhom	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠis	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠevident	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠarriving	 ﾠat	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
consciously	 ﾠasking	 ﾠhimself	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠQ	 ﾠand	 ﾠreasoning	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“P,	 ﾠso	 ﾠQ.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠholds	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠdeliberated,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠrationale	 ﾠif	 ﾠqueried.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠperson	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠcite	 ﾠP	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠQ	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsee	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠ–	 ﾠunless	 ﾠhe	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sort	 ﾠof	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠabnormal	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠ
standpoint	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthings	 ﾠare	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠhe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpresently	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠQ	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠasserted	 ﾠby	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠexistence	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠknow	 ﾠit	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 36	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠreason.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠexpressed	 ﾠby	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠactual	 ﾠreasoning,	 ﾠhis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠhas	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠhe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
disposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠreason	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠreflected.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHe	 ﾠmust	 ﾠ–	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠa	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠhis	 ﾠreflective	 ﾠstandpoint	 ﾠand	 ﾠhis	 ﾠfirst-ﾭ‐order	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠ–	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
disposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠQ	 ﾠby	 ﾠappeal	 ﾠto	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠconnection	 ﾠwith	 ﾠQ.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠhe	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠdisposition,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠhe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠP,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanation	 ﾠof	 ﾠhis	 ﾠ
now	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ(C)	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠof	 ﾠhim.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ What	 ﾠthese	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠsuggest,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠbasis	 ﾠis,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠan	 ﾠenergeia	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
doxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.34	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
her	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdeems	 ﾠadequate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAnd	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
condition	 ﾠis	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠactive,	 ﾠinasmuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠmanifests	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠcontinuing	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcorrectness	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠobtaining.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhereas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
person	 ﾠwho	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠpain,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠholds	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠshe	 ﾠendorses	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
state,	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson’s	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠP	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠshe	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠQ	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠobtaining	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠ
depends	 ﾠon	 ﾠher	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠQ	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠproposition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ground	 ﾠthat	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHer	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠactive	 ﾠor	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠintelligible	 ﾠsense:	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
ground	 ﾠlies	 ﾠin	 ﾠher	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcorrectness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠcondition.35	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
accepting	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠshe	 ﾠperforms	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠherself;	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠfact	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠher	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠgrounded	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠconsists.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠher	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠforefront	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠattention	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
34	 ﾠI	 ﾠcontinue	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠword	 ﾠ“normal”	 ﾠto	 ﾠleave	 ﾠroom	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaccessible	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠreflection.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠI	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdefend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠbeliefs,	 ﾠas	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠcreature,	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠunderstood	 ﾠas	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠalbeit	 ﾠones	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠnot	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠfull	 ﾠrealization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor,	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠjust	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
capacity	 ﾠactively	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreature	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠto	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠis	 ﾠfully	 ﾠactualized.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis,	 ﾠI	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠis	 ﾠjust	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstance	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
general	 ﾠfact	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠacts	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcharacterized:	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
conceptually	 ﾠprior	 ﾠto	 ﾠcases	 ﾠof	 ﾠfailed	 ﾠactualization,	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe.	 ﾠ
35	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠof	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠinvoked	 ﾠhere	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠdiscussion.	 ﾠ	 ﾠMy	 ﾠaim	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠwhatever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdetails	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠan	 ﾠactive	 ﾠcapacity,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
reason	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠall	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠcapacities	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠones	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠkinēsis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 37	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠshe	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠconsiders	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠQ,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresent,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
actually,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreflect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Once	 ﾠwe	 ﾠallow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠactive	 ﾠin	 ﾠholding	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠ
moreover,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsiderations	 ﾠrecommend	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠitself	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠan	 ﾠactualization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsome	 ﾠspecific	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion.36	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠhas	 ﾠno	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠground	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠbelief,	 ﾠstill	 ﾠher	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwill	 ﾠinvolve	 ﾠher	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpersuaded	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠ–	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠshe	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbit	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠshe	 ﾠhas	 ﾠacquired	 ﾠand	 ﾠretained	 ﾠin	 ﾠmemory,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠremember	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
occasion	 ﾠof	 ﾠher	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠit	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoriginally	 ﾠpersuaded	 ﾠher.	 ﾠ	 ﾠEven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
case,	 ﾠher	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrest	 ﾠon	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠconvictions	 ﾠabout	 ﾠher	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠpowers	 ﾠ(to	 ﾠacquire	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
retain	 ﾠinformation),	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠas	 ﾠstable	 ﾠas	 ﾠher	 ﾠconfidence	 ﾠin	 ﾠthose	 ﾠconvictions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
thus	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠperfectly	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrationally	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠcondition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSo	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ
that,	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject’s	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠshe	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠher	 ﾠenduring	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠholding	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠtrue.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ These	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAristotelian	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠquoted	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhead	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠaccording	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠ“implies	 ﾠconviction,	 ﾠconviction	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpersuaded,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠpersuasion	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠreason.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠpersuaded	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
absurd	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠmeant	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevery	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠbecoming	 ﾠ
persuaded;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠhas	 ﾠequipped	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠneed	 ﾠimply	 ﾠno	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthing.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis:	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠis	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhim	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠhis	 ﾠpower	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
persuaded	 ﾠby	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠactualized	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠand	 ﾠpersisting	 ﾠact	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecies	 ﾠof	 ﾠevent	 ﾠor	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠan	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠaltogether	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtype,	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠspecify.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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36	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ“belief”	 ﾠis	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠfor	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsense,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
rational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeliefs.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠmy	 ﾠagenda	 ﾠto	 ﾠdispute,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
nonrational	 ﾠanimals	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠsense.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠto	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠrational	 ﾠ
animal	 ﾠactualizes	 ﾠa	 ﾠricher	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠthan	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnonrational	 ﾠanimal.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
issue,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBoyle	 ﾠForthcoming	 ﾠ(2).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
5.4	 ﾠ To	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthis	 ﾠre-ﾭ‐conception	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeny	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determined	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠof	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
judging.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠplainly	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠthing	 ﾠas	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmay	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠthinking	 ﾠto	 ﾠoneself:	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠThese	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ
intentionally	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠout	 ﾠgrounds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠenable	 ﾠone	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠP,	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsciously	 ﾠ
expressing	 ﾠto	 ﾠoneself	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠone	 ﾠaccepts	 ﾠ–	 ﾠare	 ﾠones	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠa	 ﾠperson	 ﾠcan	 ﾠnormally	 ﾠengage	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠher	 ﾠdiscretion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠrespect,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtangible	 ﾠacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscussing	 ﾠaloud	 ﾠ
whether	 ﾠP	 ﾠand	 ﾠasserting:	 ﾠYes,	 ﾠP.	 ﾠ	 ﾠNothing	 ﾠI	 ﾠhave	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠto	 ﾠdenigrate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
importance	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠseems	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠability	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠ
precondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠto	 ﾠgovern	 ﾠour	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠstate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠlike	 ﾠ
Korsgaard	 ﾠand	 ﾠMcDowell	 ﾠhighlight	 ﾠ(§1.1).37	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠability	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠprecondition	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
basic	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠagency	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexercise	 ﾠover	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeliefs:	 ﾠour	 ﾠpower,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
circumstance	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdoxastic	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠis	 ﾠbrought	 ﾠinto	 ﾠoperation,	 ﾠnor	 ﾠ
again	 ﾠto	 ﾠexpress	 ﾠto	 ﾠourselves	 ﾠour	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠactually	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
answer	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaccept.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ I	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠactualized,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠdeliberating	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
consciously	 ﾠjudging,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠholding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaccept	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlose	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
entitlement	 ﾠto	 ﾠhold	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrational	 ﾠbelievers	 ﾠare	 ﾠcapable	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠsort	 ﾠof	 ﾠcognitive	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐
determination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠprecisely	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠaccepting	 ﾠthis	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠput	 ﾠ
ourselves	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠposition	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠsense	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠ(§1.2)	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination	 ﾠseemed	 ﾠdark	 ﾠon	 ﾠreflection,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
temptation	 ﾠ–	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠup	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmind	 ﾠby	 ﾠpositing	 ﾠsome	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbrings	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠmind	 ﾠis	 ﾠmade	 ﾠup	 ﾠ–	 ﾠgave	 ﾠrise	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠseries	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifficulties	 ﾠ(§§3.3,	 ﾠ3.5,	 ﾠ3.6).	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
37	 ﾠOne	 ﾠmerit	 ﾠI	 ﾠwould	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠenables	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreal	 ﾠtopic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
investigation	 ﾠhere:	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠour	 ﾠcapacity	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconscious	 ﾠthought	 ﾠcontribute	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsorts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
creatures	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhold	 ﾠbeliefs?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
holding	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelief	 ﾠmight	 ﾠitself	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“energetic”	 ﾠact	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐determination,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
difficulties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠagency	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠwork	 ﾠnot	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstallation	 ﾠor	 ﾠmodification	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
beliefs,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠcharacteristic	 ﾠof	 ﾠrational	 ﾠcreatures,	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠbelieving	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
self-ﾭ‐determined,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠin	 ﾠvirtue	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠprecedent	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠor	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠby	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecial	 ﾠkind	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐affirmed	 ﾠcondition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠis.38	 ﾠ
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38	 ﾠThis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworks	 ﾠa	 ﾠlong	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠand	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠindebted	 ﾠto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠand	 ﾠadvice:	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Alp	 ﾠAker,	 ﾠPhil	 ﾠClarke,	 ﾠJim	 ﾠConant,	 ﾠDavid	 ﾠFinkelstein,	 ﾠWolfram	 ﾠGobsch,	 ﾠMatthias	 ﾠHaase,	 ﾠPamela	 ﾠHieronymi,	 ﾠ
Doug	 ﾠLavin,	 ﾠJohn	 ﾠMcDowell,	 ﾠDick	 ﾠMoran,	 ﾠSebastian	 ﾠRödl,	 ﾠAmélie	 ﾠRorty,	 ﾠKieran	 ﾠSetiya,	 ﾠNishi	 ﾠShah,	 ﾠSusanna	 ﾠ
Siegel,	 ﾠMichael	 ﾠThompson,	 ﾠJennifer	 ﾠWhiting,	 ﾠKritika	 ﾠYegnashankaran,	 ﾠAriel	 ﾠZylberman.	 ﾠ	 ﾠI	 ﾠam	 ﾠalso	 ﾠgrateful	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠgenerous	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠof	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠreviewers	 ﾠfor	 ﾠPhilosopher’s	 ﾠImprint,	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠaudiences	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
Brandeis	 ﾠUniversity,	 ﾠUCLA,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUniversities	 ﾠof	 ﾠBasel,	 ﾠChicago,	 ﾠGeneva,	 ﾠLeipzig,	 ﾠand	 ﾠToronto.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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